The Compositional Security Checker (CSC for short) is a semantic tool for the automatic veri cation of some compositional information ow properties. The speci cations given as inputs to CSC are terms of the Security Process Algebra, a language suited for the speci cation of systems where actions belong to two di erent levels of con dentiality. The information ow security properties which can be veri ed by CSC are some of those classi ed in 4]. They are derivations of some classic notions, e.g. Non Interference 6]. The tool is based on the same architecture of the Concurrency Workbench 2], from which some modules have been integrally imported. The usefulness of the tool is tested with the signi cative case-study of an access-monitor.
Introduction
Security is a crucial property of system behaviour, requiring a strict control over the information ow among parts of the system. The main problem is to limit, and possibly to avoid, the damages produced by malicious programs, called Trojan Horses, which try to broadcast secret information. There are several approaches to solve this problem.
In the Discretionary Access Control security (DAC for short), every subject decides the access properties of its objects. An example of DAC is the le management in Unix where a user can decide the access possibilities of her/his les. So, if a user executes a Trojan Horse program, this can modify the security properties of user's objects.
A solution to this problem is the Mandatory Access Control (MAC for short), where access rules are imposed by the system. An example of MAC is Multilevel Security 1]: every object is bounded to a security level, and so every subject is; information can ow from a certain object to a certain S1 O1
S2 O2
Read-down
Level n Level n+k FIGURE 1. Information ows in multilevel security.
subject only if the level of the subject is greater than the level of the object. So a Trojan Horse, which operates at a certain level, has no way to downgrade information, and its action is restricted inside such a level. There are two access rules: No Read Up (a subject cannot read data from an upper level object) and No Write Down (a subject cannot write data to a lower level object). However, these access rules are not enough. It could be possible to indirectly transmit information using some system side e ect. For example, if two levels {`high' and`low' { share some nite storage resource, it is possible to transmit data from level`high' to level`low' by using the`resource full' error message. For a high level transmitter, it is su cient to alternatively ll or empty the resource in order to transmit a`1' or a`0' datum. Simultaneously, the low level receiver tries to write on the resource, decoding every error message as a`1' and every successful write as a`0'. It is clear that such indirect ways of transmission, called covert channels, do not violate the two multilevel access rules (see Figure 1 ). Therefore it is necessary to integrate a MAC discipline with a covert channel analysis (see e.g. 10] ).
An alternative, more general approach to security requires to control directly the whole ow of information, rather than the accesses of subjects to objects. To make this, it is necessary to choose a formal model of system behaviour and to de ne the information ow on such a model. By imposing some information ow rule, we can control any kind of transmission, be it direct or indirect.
In the literature, there are many di erent de nitions of this kind based on several system models (see e.g. 6, 11] ). In 4] we have rephrased them in the uniform setting of Security Process Algebra (SPA, for short), then compared and classi ed. SPA is an extension of CCS 9] which permits to describe systems where actions belong to two di erent levels of con dentiality.
For some of the investigated information ow properties, we provided useful algebraic characterizations. They are all of the following form. Let E be an SPA process term, let X be a security property, let be a semantic equivalence among process terms and let C X and D X be two SPA contexts for property X. Then, we can say: E is X-secure if and only if C X E] D X E].
Hence, checking the X-security of E is reduced to the \standard" problem of checking semantic equivalence between two terms having E as a subterm. In recent years a certain number of tools for checking semantic equivalence have been presented; among them, the Concurrency Workbench (CW for short) 2] is one of the most famous.
The aim of this work is to present a tool called Compositional Security Checker which can be used to check automatically ( nite state) SPA speci cations against some information ow security properties. The tool has the same modular architecture of CW (Version 6.1), from which some modules have been integrally imported and some others only modi ed.
The tool is equipped with a parser, which transforms an SPA speci cation into a parse-tree; then, for the parsed speci cation CSC builds the labelled transition system following the operational rules de ned in Plotkin' SOS style. When a user wants to check if an SPA process E is X-secure, CSC rst provides operational semantic descriptions to the terms C X E] and D X E] in the form of two lts's; then veri es the semantic equivalence of C X E] and D X E] using their lts representations.
An interesting feature of CSC is the exploitation of the compositionality of some security property. The main problem in the veri cation of security properties is the exponential state explosion due to parallel composition. As an example consider two agents E 1 and E 2 ; the number of states of their parallel composition E 1 jE 2 is equal to the product of the states of E 1 and E 2 . Now if we have a compositional security property X, i.e. such that F 1 jF 2 is X-secure whenever F 1 and F 2 are X-secure, then we can apply the following strategy: check the X-security of E 1 and E 2 ; if it is satis ed conclude that E 1 jE 2 is X-secure, otherwise check the X-security of the whole agent E 1 jE 2 . Using this strategy for compositional security properties, CSC is able to avoid, in some cases, the exponential state explosion due to parallel composition operator.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present SPA. In Section 3 we recall from 4] some of the security properties which are veri ed by CSC giving some examples. Section 4.1 reports the input-output behavior of CSC, while in Section 4.2 we describe the architecture of the tool. The implementation of the security predicates is the subject of Section 5. Then, a sample session with the interactive tool is described in Section 6.1 and Section 6.2 is devoted to a case-study (access-monitor). Finally, Section 7 is about the state explosion problem and the compositional algorithm.
SPA and Semantic Equivalences
In the following,systems will be speci ed using the Security Process Algebra (SPA for short), a slight extension of Milner's CCS 9] . SPA includes two more operators, namely the hiding operator E=L of CSP 7] and the (new) input restriction operator E n I L, which are useful in characterizing some security properties in an algebraic style. Intuitively E n I L can execute all the actions process E is able to do, provided that they are not inputs in L. Moreover the set of visible actions is partitioned into high level actions and low level ones in order to specify multilevel systems. by ; a set K of constants, ranged over by Z. The syntax of SPA agents is de ned as follows:
where L L and f : Act ! Act is such that f( ) = f( ); f( ) = .
Moreover, for every constant Z there must be the corresponding de nition: Z def = E. The meaning of 0, :E, E + E, EjE, E n L, E f] and Z def = E is as for CCS 9] .
Let E be the set of closed and guarded 9] SPA agents, ranged over by E, F. Let L(E) denote the sort of E, i.e., the set of the (possibly executable) actions occurring syntactically in E. The sets of high level agents and low level ones are de ned as E H def = fE 2 E j L(E) Act H f gg and E L def = fE 2 E j L(E) Act L f gg, respectively. The operational semantics of SPA is given (as usual) associating to each agent a particular state of the labelled transition system (E; Act; !) where ! E Act E and, intuitively, E ! E 0 means that agent E can execute moving to E 0 .
We recall here the de nition of weak bisimulation 9] over SPA agents.
In the following the expression E =) E 0 is a shorthand for E( !) E 1 ! E 2 ( !) E 0 , where ( !) denotes a (possibly empty) sequence of labelled transitions. Moreover E^ =) E 0 stands for E =) E 0 if 2 L, and for E ( !) E 0 if = (note that ( !) means \zero or more labelled transitions" while =) requires at least one labelled transition). Now we present a value-passing extension of SPA (VSPA, for short). All the examples contained in this paper will be done using such value passing calculus, because it originates more readable speci cations than those written in pure SPA. As in 9], the semantics of the value-passing calculus can be given via translation into the pure calculus 3].
The syntax of VSPA agents is de ned as follows:
E ::= 0 j a(x 1 ; : : :; x n ):E j a(e 1 ; : : :; e n ):E j :E j E + E j EjE j j E n L j E n I L j E=L j E f] j A(e 0 1 ; : : :; e 0 n ) j j if b then E j if b then E else E where the variables x 1 ; : : :; x n and the value expressions e 1 ; : : :; e n and e 0 1 ; : : :; e 0 n must be consistent with the arity of the action a and constant A respectively (the arity speci es the sorts of the parameters) and b is a boolean expression. An example of VSPA agent speci cation follows. Figure 2 ) handles read and write requests from high and low level users on two binary variables: a high level and a low level one. It achieves no read up and no write down access control rules allowing a high level user to read from both objects and write only on the high one; conversely, a low level user is allowed to write on both objects and read only from the low val (1,y) write (1,z) val ( one. Users interact with the monitor through the following access actions: access r(l; x); access w(l; x); write(l; z) where l is the user level (l = 0 low, l = 1 high), x is the object (x = 0 low, x = 1 high) and z is the binary value to be written. As an example, consider access r(0; 1) which represents a low level user (l = 0) read request from the high level object (x = 1), and access w(1; 0) followed by write(1; 0) which represents a high level user (l = 1) write request of value 0 (z = 0) on the low object (x = 0). Read results are returned to users through the output actions val(l; y).
Some Information Flow Properties
In this section we present some of the security properties (see 3, 4] for more details) which can be veri ed using CSC.
Bisimulation Non-deterministic Non Interference (BNNI , for short) is a generalization of Non Interference 6]. Intuitively, the high level does not interfere with the low level if and only if a low level user cannot distinguish between processes E and E n I Act H . In other words a system is BNNI if what a low level user sees of the system cannot be modi ed by any high level input.
De nition 3.1 E 2 BNNI , (E n I Act H )=Act H B E=Act H Example 3.2 Consider the following modi ed monitor 3 In we have 2 accesses to the monitor: rst a high level user modi es the value of the low object writing-down value 1 and then the low user reads value 1 from the object. If we purge of high level actions we obtain the sequence 0 = access r(0; 0):val(0; 1) that, clearly, can not be a trace for Access Monitor 2. In fact, in 0 , we have that a low level user reads 1 from the low level object without other interactions between the monitor and the environment (note that the initial values of the objects is 0). Moreover it is not possible to obtain a trace for Access Monitor 2 adding to 0 only high level outputs, because all the high level outputs in Access Monitor 2 are pre xed by high level inputs. Hence 0 is not a trace for (Access Monitor 2n I Act H )=Act H too. In other words, it is not possible to nd a trace 00 with the same low level actions of and without high level inputs.
Since In the automatic veri cation of security properties it can be very useful to work on a reduced system, i.e. a system equivalent to the original one, but with a minimum number of states. The Concurrency Workbench provides a procedure to this aim and we imported it in CSC. This is very useful because we can prove that if a system E is BNDC, then any other observational equivalent system F is BNDC. This also holds for all the other security properties. The following example shows that BSNNI and BNNI are not able to detect some deadlocks due to high level activities which, on the contrary, are revealed by BNDC (this because they do not check the system against all the possible high level interactions, as BNDC does).
Example 3.8 Consider the rst version of the monitor Access Monitor 1.
Using CSC we can verify that such system is BSNNI and BNNI , but it is not BNDC . This happens because a high level user can make a read request without accepting the corresponding output from the monitor (remember that communications in SPA are synchronous). In particular, consider = access r(1; 1):0. System (Access Monitor 1j ) n Act H will be deadlocked immediately after the execution of the read request by , blocking in the following state security property ?". The structure of CSC is described in Figure 4 . In detail, the tool is able: to parse SPA agents, saving them in suitable environments as parse trees;
to give a semantic to these parse trees, building the corresponding rooted labelled transition systems (rlts for short);
to check if an agent satis es a certain security property; the implemented routine for this purpose veri es the equivalence of two particular agents modeled as rlts. In this way, future changes of the language will not compromise the validity of the core of the tool.
Architecture
The CSC has the same general architecture of the CW. In its implementation we have decided to exploit the characteristic of versatility and extensibility of CW. In particular CSC maintains the strongly modular characteristic of CW. The modules of the system are partitioned in three main layers: interface layer, semantic layer, analysis layer.
In the interface layer we have the command interpreter. It allows us to de ne the agents and the set of high level actions; it also allows to invoke the security predicates and the utility functions on the behaviour of an agent. Then we have a parser which recognizes the SPA syntax of agents and stores them as parse trees in appropriate environments. The partition of the set of visible actions in the sets of high and low level actions has been obtained by de ning the set of high level actions; by default, all the other possible actions are considered at low level. Then we have de ned a transition function that, according to the operational semantic rule of SPA, provides all possible transitions for an agent. This function allows the construction of the transition graph associated to an agent.
In the semantic layer, CSC uses a transformation routine to translate transition graphs into observational graphs 2]. Since it refers to processes modeled as transition graphs, it has been imported from CW in CSC without any modi cation.
In the analysis layer, CSC uses a routine of equivalence and one of minimization that belong to the analysis layer of CW. These are a slight modication of the algorithm by Kanellakis and Smolka 8] which nds a bisimulation between the roots of two graphs by partitioning their nodes.
Security Predicates
Now, we want to explain brie y how the system works in evaluating security predicates BNNI, BSNNI, SBSNNI, discussing, at the same time, about their computational complexity. CSC computes the value of these predicates over nite Phase a) CSC builds the transition graphs of the two agents of which it wants to compute the equivalence. For example in the case of BNNI , CSC computes the transition graph for (E?Act H )!Act H and E!Act H . In this phase we do not have any particular problem with complexity, except for the intrinsic exponential explosion in the number of nodes of the graphs due to parallel composition.
Phase b) The two transition graphs obtained in Phase a) are transformed into observational graphs using the classic algorithms for the product of two relations and the re exive transitive closure of a relation. This transformation has a O(n 3 ) complexity, in which n is the number of nodes in the original graph.
Phase c) The general equivalence algorithm 8] is applied to the graphs obtained in Phase b). Time and space complexities of this algorithm are O(k l) and O(k + l) respectively, where l is the number of nodes and k is the number of edges in the two graphs. This is not a limiting factor in the computation of the observational equivalence. In particular we have that in most cases 80% of computation time is due to the routine for re exive transitive closure of Phase b).
Since SBSNNI is veri ed by testing BSNNI over all the n states of the original graph, the resulting complexity will be n times the BSNNI complexity.
It is interesting to observe that the exponential explosion of the number of nodes of the transition graphs (Phase a), due to the operator of parallel composition, in uences negatively the following phases, but it can not be avoided because of its intrinsic nature. A solution to this problem for the predicate SBSNNI could be based on the exploitation of compositional properties proved in 4] and recalled in Section 7.
6 Using CSC We assumed that the set of visible actions L is partitioned in two sub- Object_h0 rl0/rh0,rl1/rh1,wl0/wh0,wl1/wh1] basi L rh0 rh1 rl0 rl1 wh0 wh1 wl0 wl1 acth rh0 rh1 wh0 wh1 access_r_hh access_r_hl val_h0 val_h1 val_h_err \ access_w_hh access_w_hl write_h0 write_h1 
Checking the Access Monitor
In this Section we use CSC to analyze the systems of Example 3.8. Since CSC works on SPA agents we have to translate all the VSPA speci cations into SPA. Consider system Access Monitor 1. Table. 1 reports the translation of Access Monitor 1 speci cation into the CSC syntax. 6 The new command basi has been used to bind a set of actions to an identier. Moreover, the n character at the end of a line does not represent the restriction operator, but is the special character that permits to break in more lines the description of long agents and long action lists. We can write to a le the contents of Table. 1 and load it, in CSC, with command if < lename>. Now we can check that Access Monitor 1 satises all the security properties except SBSNNI using the following command lines:
Command: bnni Access Monitor 1 true Command: bsnni Access Monitor 1 6 In the translation, we use fl; hg in place of f0; 1g for the levels of users and objects in order to make the SPA speci cation more clear. Formally we make the translation considering variables l and x ranging in fl; hg. As an example access r(1; 0) becomes access r hl true Command: sbsnni Access Monitor 1 false: ( 0 val h1:Monitor j Object l1 j Object h1) n L 7 Note that when SBSNNI fails for a process E, CSC gives as output an agent E 0 which is reachable from E and is not BSNNI . In the following we will show that this can be useful to decide if E is BNDC. So we have found that Access Monitor 1 2 BSNNI ; BNNI and Access Monitor 1 = 2 SBSNNI Since SBSNNI BNDC BSNNI ; BNNI (see Proposition 3.6), we cannot conclude whether Access Monitor 1 is BNDC or not. However using the output of SBSNNI it is easy to nd a high level process which can deadlock the monitor. In fact, in the state given as output by SB-SNNI , the monitor is waiting for the high level action 0 val h1; so, if we nd a process which leads the system to such a state and does not execute the val h1 action, we will have a high level process able to deadlock the monitor. It is su cient to consider = 0 access r hh:0. System (Access Monitor 1j )nAct H will be deadlocked immediately after the execution of the read request by , blocking in the following state (( 0 val h0:Monitor j Object l0 j Object h0) n L j 0) n Act H (this state di ers from the one given as output by SBSNNI only for the values stored in objects). We verify that Access Monitor 1 is not BNDC by checking that (Access Monitor 1j ) n Act H 6 B Access Monitor 1=Act H using the following commands:
Command: bi Pi 0 access r hh:0 Command: eq Agent: (Access Monitor 1 j Pi) n acth Agent: Access Monitor 1 ! acth false As we said in Example 3.8, such a deadlock is caused by synchronous communications in SPA. Moreover, using the CSC output again, we can nd out that also the high level process 0 = 0 access w hl:0 can deadlock Access Monitor 1, this because it executes a write request and does not send the corresponding value. Hence, in Example 3.8 we proposed the modi ed system Access Monitor 3 with an output bu er for each level and atomic actions for write request and value sending. We nally check that this version of the monitor is SBSNNI 
State Explosion and Compositionality
We now want to plain out how the parallel composition operator can increase exponentially the number of states of the system, and then how it can slow down the execution speed of security predicate veri cation. As we will see that SBSNNI is preserved by system composition, the two agents BjDjB and BjDjDjB must also be SBSNNI secure. Hence the verication of these two agents can be reduced to the veri cation of their two basic components B and D only. The time spent in verifying SBSNNI directly on BjDjB and BjDjDjB is very long. Using the size command of CSC, which computes the number of states of an agent, we can ll in Table. 2, which points out the exponential increase of the number of states and the consequent increase of the computation time for veri cation of SBSNNI . Theorem 7.1 5] The following hold:
(i) E; F 2 SBSNNI =) (EjF) 2 SBSNNI (ii) E 2 SBSNNI ; L L =) E n L 2 SBSNNI In the following E FS E will denote the set of closed and guarded SPA agents with a nite lts. CSC is able to exploit the compositionality of security properties through the following algorithm:
De nition 7.2 (Compositional Algorithm) Let P E be a set of SPA agents such that E; E 0 2 P =) EjE 0 2 P E 2 P; L L =) E n L 2 P and A P be an algorithm which checks if a certain agent E 2 E FS belongs to P; in other words A P (E) = true if E 2 P and A P (E) = false otherwise.
Then we can de ne a compositional algorithm A 0 P (E) in the following way: 1) if E is in the form E 0 nL (recursively) calculate A 0 P (E 0 ); if A 0 P (E 0 ) = true then return true else return the result of A P (E);
2) if E is in the form E 1 jE 2 (recursively) calculate A 0 P (E 1 ) and A 0 P (E 2 ); if A 0 P (E 1 ) = A 0 P (E 2 ) = true then return true else return the result of A P (E); 3) otherwise return A P (E). Note that the algorithm requires that property P is closed with respect to restriction and uses this in step 1. This could seem useless; however, the parallel composition is often in the following form: (AjB) n L (in order to force some synchronization) and so if we want to check P over A and B separately, we must be granted that P is preserved by both parallel and restriction operators. We have the following correctness result for the compositionality algorithm: Theorem 7.3 Let F 2 E FS be a nite state SPA agent. If, every time the algorithm executes step 1, E 0 belongs to E FS , then A 0 P (F) terminates and A P (F) = A 0 P (F).
Proof. First, note that in step 1 of A 0 P it is E 0 2 E FS (by hypothesis) and in step 2 if E 2 E FS then E 1 ; E 2 2 E FS . As F 2 E FS , then we recursively obtain that every E, E 0 and E 1 ; E 2 of steps 1, 2 and 3 belong to E FS . So, when the algorithm executes A P (E) in steps 1,2 or 3, it terminates because E 2 E FS .
We still have to prove that, in steps 1 and 2, A 0 P (E 0 ) and A 0 P (E 1 ); A 0 P (E 2 )
terminate. In particular we must prove that for every F 0 2 E FS the evaluation of A 0 P (F 0 ) never needs to evaluate A 0 P (F 0 ) itself (going into an in nite loop). This holds because agents in E FS are guarded; so the evaluation of A 0 P (F 0 ) could at most need to evaluate A 0 P ( :F 0 ) where is the guard for F 0 . Hence A 0 P (F) terminates.
When the algorithm calculates A P (E) in steps 1, 2 and 3 it is always E 2 E FS , so A P (E) = true if E 2 P and A P (E) = false if E 6 2 P. Hence, by (partial) structural induction and using compositionality properties, we obtain that A P (F) = A 0 P (F). The theorem above requires that, every time the algorithm executes step Monitor (1) Interface (0) Interface (1) Buf (1,y) Buf (1,y) r ( Example 7.4 Consider again Access Monitor 3. The veri cation of the SBSNNI property on such a system requires a lot of time (more than 1 hour on a SUN5 workstation) because of the above mentioned exponential state explosion due to parallel composition. We can try to verify SBSNNI using the compositional algorithm. Unfortunately we have that Monitor is not SBSNNI and so, in this case, the compositional technique cannot help us to reduce the execution time. This happens because the BNDC -security of Access Monitor 3 depends on both monitor and objects; i.e. process Monitor is not able to guarantee multilevel security for every possible object connected to it. As an example, consider the following modi ed objects:
Object(x; y) def = r(x; y):Object(x; 0) + w(x; z):Object(x; z) which reset (to zero) their value every time they are read. Using these objects, we obtain a system which is not BSNNI and so is not BNDC . In such a system, a high level user can change (to zero) the value of the low level variable by simply reading it. This is generally called \half-bit" covert channel because the high level user can set the low level variable only to one of the two possible values (in this case 0) and so can transmit only a half-bit information to low level. In 3] we show how to construct a 1-bit channel using some half-bit ones.
Finally we present a version of the Access Monitor ( Figure 5 ) which can be veri ed very e ciently by exploiting the compositionality of SBSNNI .
Here every object has a \private" monitor which implements the access functions for such (single) object. To make this, we have decomposed process Monitor (which is not BNDC ) into two di erent processes, one for each object; then we have composed such processes to respective objects together with a high level bu er obtaining the BNDC -secure Modh and Modl agents. In particular, Monitor(x) handles the accesses to object x (x = 0 low, x = 1 high). We also have an interface which guarantees the exclusive use of the monitor within the same level. Moreover the new interface actions a r(l; x), a w(l; x; z) and put(l; y) substitute actions access r(l; x), access w(l; x; z) and res(l; y) in the interaction between the users and the monitor. where L = fres; access r; access wg, Lh = fr; w; val(1; y)g and Ll = fr; w; val(1; y)g. 20 minutes (about 20 times longer than checking the equivalent process Access Monitor 4). Note that checking (Access Monitor 3jInterf)nL requires less time than checking Access Monitor 3 alone. So for this agent the compositional algorithm takes more time with respect to direct checking. This happens because (Access Monitor 3jInterf) n L has less states than Access Monitor 3; in fact, the interface reduces the internal parallelism in system Access Monitor 3 (in particular the parallelism given by the action of the bu ers). Hence it is useful to adopt the compositional technique when building complex systems as parallel composition of simpler ones, i.e. when the number of states increases (e.g. as in Access Monitor 4).
